In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons" judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.
The notion that depressed individuals view the future in a pessimistic light is central to virtually all cognitive theories of depression. Beck (1967) referred to this pessimism about oneself, one's world, and one's future as the depressive triad, a basic set of maladaptive attitudes that underlie depression. Kuiper, Derry, and MacDonald (1982) have recently argued that a negatively toned depressive self-schema exerts an influence on a wide range of cognitive activities, including probability judgments. Similarly, helplessness theorists (e.g., Abramson, Selignmn, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975) view low expectancies for the occurrence of highly desired outcomes as the proximal cause of a wide range of depressive deficits. The purpose of our research was to (a) investigate the nature of these assumed differences between depressed and nondepressed persons' likelihood estimates for future life events and (b) investigate the role that selffocused attention might play in mediating such differences. The theoretical rationale for this latter possibility is discussed in the introduction to our second study.
Recent empirical investigations of the cognitive characteristics of depression have demonstrated a wide range of dimensions on which depressed and nondepressed persons differ. Many of these studies seem to suggest that the depressed person's negative outlook may actually represent an absence of the self-enhancing optimistic biases typically exhibited by nondeWe wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tom Pyszczynski, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80933-7150. 994 pressed persons. Specifically, depressed persons have been shown not to exhibit biases typically found among nondepressed persons in their attributions for positive and negative outcomes (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978) , evaluations of their own competence (e.g., Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980) , judgments of control over positive and negative outcomes (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Golin, Terrcll, Weitz, & Drost, 1979) , and recall of positive and negative feedback (e.g., Nelson & Craighead, 1977) . These findings seem to suggest that, whereas nondepressed persons would exhibit an optimistic bias in judgments of the probability of future life events, depressed persons would tend to be evenhanded and objective when making such judgments.
Research on judgments of the likelihood of future life events in nonclinical samples (e.g., Drake, 1984; Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982) has shown that most people do indeed exhibit optimistic biases, judging positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than to others and negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to others. Research examining depressed persons' probability judgments has shown that they are generally more pessimistic than their nondepressed counterparts. For example, Lobitz and Post (1979) have shown that depressed subjects expect less successful performance for themselves on a series of laboratory tasks than do nondepressed subjects. Similarly, Garber and Hollon (1980) demonstrated that depressed subjects show less positive changes in expectancies for future performance after succeeding on a laboratory task than do nondepressed subjects.
Although these studies demonstrate that depressed persons are pessimistic about their performance in the laboratory, there has been relatively little systematic research investigating their estimates of the likelihood of major life events. Recently, Pietromonaco and Markus (1985) have provided evidence on this issue. In their study, depressed and nondepressed subjects were asked to form a mental image of either themselves or an aquaintance involved in each of a series of events and then to rate how either they or their aquaintance would feel if the event happened and the likelihood that the event would happen to either themselves or their aquaintance. Subjects' affective ratings were used to idiographicaUy divide the events into happy and sad categoties. The data indicated that depressed subjects viewed sad events as more likely to happen to themselves than to their aquaintance; furthermore, depressed subjects viewed sad events as more likely to happen to themselves than did nondepressed persons. No differences were found in subjects' ratings of the likelihood of happy events.
Our first study was conceptually similar to that of Pietromonaco and Markus, although several aspects of the procedure were different. In the Pietromonaco and Markus study, an event was included in the analysis for a given subject only if that subject had rated it in the upper or lower third of a 9-point scale assessing how they (or their acquaintance) would feel if the event happened; significantly more of these events fell into the happy than the sad category. Although Pietromonaco and Markus reported that the number of events rated as happy or sad did not differ as a function of depression, it is likely that there was at least some variability in which events met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis for the two categories of subjects. To make sure that comparisons between depressed and nondepressed persons were based on judgments of the likelihood of the same events, we used a standard set of positive and negative events for all subjects, adapted from that used by Weinstein (1980) .
The other major deviation of our procedure from that used by Pietromonaco and Markus was implemented because of the possibility that differences between the probability judgments of depressed and nondepressed persons result from their differential self-focusing tendencies (of. Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1985, in press ). In setting up their self-other manipulation, Pietromonaco and Markus instructed subjects to "form a mental picture of yourself (your friend) in the event and visualize it as clearly as possible" (1985, p. 801) . It seems likely that these instructions may have substantially increased the level of selffocus for subjects in the self-judgment condition and decreased the level of self-focus for subjects in the other-judgment condition. Because we intended to manipulate focus of attention and target of judgment independently in our second study, we used a within-subjects manipulation of recipient of event and avoided instructions directing subjects to form images of themselves or others.
Study 1
Our first study was an investigation of depressed and nondepressed persons' estimates of the likelihood of positive and negative events occurring to themselves and to others. On the basis of previous findings of depressive realism and optimistic bias on the part of nondepressed persons, we predicted that, whereas nondepressed persons would estimate the likelihood of positive events happening to themselves as greater than the likelihood of both negative events happening to themselves and positive events happening to others, depressed persons would show n o such bias. This first study provides a conceptual replication of previous findings and a baseline with which the findings of our second study can be compared.
M e t h o d
Subjects. Seventy-three female undergraduates ~ participated in the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Of these, 46 met our criteria to be included in the final analyses, which were similar to classification criteria used in other recent research on depression (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979) . Subjects with scores of 11 or above on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967 ) and 13 or above on the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL; Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965) were classified as depressed; subjects with scores of 4 or below on the BDI and 12 or below on the MAACL were classified as nondepressed. Subjects who did not meet these criteria were not included in the analysis. The final sample was composed of 29 nondepressed persons (BDI M = 2.0, MAACL M = 7.5) and 14 depressed persons (BDI M = 14.6, MAACL M = 17.0).
Procedure. Subjects reported to the experiment in groups ranging in size from 20 to 40 and were told that the study was concerned with how people make judgments. They were further informed that some of the judgments they would be asked to make dealt with feelings and some with events; some would involve themselves and some would involve other people. They were then given a booklet of questionnaires and told to think carefully about their responses. The booklet consisted of (in order) the MAACL, the BDI, and an event questionnaire in which they were asked to make a series of judgments about 20 hypothetical events. These events were adapted from those used by Weinstein (1980) . Half of the events were positive (e.g., having a mentally gifted child; traveling to Europe) and half were negative (e.g., not finding a job for 6 months; heart attack before age 40). The events were presented in two random orders, which were counterbalanced in the design.
For each event, subjects were asked to rate (a) the likelihood of the event happening to themselves, (b) the likelihood of the event happening to the typical undergraduate at their university, (c) the controllability of the event, and (d) the desirability of the event. Subjects indicated their likelihood judgments on a 50-point scale (1 --extremely unlikely; 50 = extremely likely). The controllability and desirability judgments were made on 9-point scales (1 = uncontrollable or undesirable; 9 = controllable or desirable). When finished, subjects were given experimental credit and thanked for their participation.
R e s u l t s a n d Discussion 2
Desirability. A 2 (depression) • 2 (desirability) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with desirability of event and recipient of event treated as within-subjects factors, performed on subjects' ratings of the desirability of events revealed a main effect of the ' We used only female subjects in this research because of a scarcity of male subjects who would meet the criteria for classification as depressed. Because of this limitation, the results may not be generalizable to men.
2 The controllability of the various events was also included as an independent variable (more controllable vs. less controllable events) in preliminary analyses of the data for both studies. However, because it did not contribute significantly to main effects or interactions on the major dependent measures of either study, it is omitted from further discussion. Table 1 . Depressed subjects' desirability judgments were generally more moderate than those made by nondepressed subjects; depressed subjects rated positive events as less desirable, t(41 ) = 1.84, p < . 10, and negative events as less undesirable, t(41) = 2.23, p < .05, than did nondepressed subjects. Nonetheless, both groups of subjects clearly rated the positive events as more desirable than the negative events.
Probability. A 2 (depression) • 2 (desirability) X 2 (recipient of event)
ANOVA WaS performed on subjects' probability judgments, with desirability of event and recipient of event treated as within-subjects factors. Main effects for desirability of event,/7(1, 41) = 55.93, p < .000 l, and recipient of event, F(I, 41) = 27.20, p < .0001, were found. A significant Depression • Desirability of Event interaction was also found, F(l, 41) = 20.44, p < .000 t. These effects were qualified, however, by a significant Depression • Desirability of Event x Recipient of Event interaction, F(l, 41) = 24.64, p < .0001. Relevant means for this effect are displayed in Table 2 .
To explicate this three-way interaction, a series of planned pairwise comparisons were performed. As seen in Table 2 , nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely than negative events for themselves, t(28) = 14.89, p < .001, and for others, t(28) = 6.8 l, p < .001. Nondepressed subjects also rated negative events as less likely for themselves than for others, t(28) = 7.16, p < .001, but showed no self-versus-other difference in their ratings of the probability of positive events, t(28) = .91, ns.
The pattern of means for depressed subjects was very different. Depressed subjects did not differ in their probability estimates for positive and negative events for self, t(13) --.38, ns, but did judge that positive events were more likely than negative events for others, t(l 3) = 3.34, p < .01. Depressed subjects also indicated that both positive and negative events were less likely for themselves than for others, t(13) = 5.52, p < .001, and t(l 3) = 2.56, p < .05, respectively.
Turning to comparisons between depressed and nondepressed subjects, we found that nondepressed subjects judged positive events as more likely for themselves and less likely for others, t(41) = 5.15, p < .001, and t(41) = 2.01, p < .06, whereas depressed subjects rated negative events as more likely for both themselves and others, t(41 ) = 6.45, p < .001, and t(41 ) = 3.64, p < .02, respectively.
Controllability. A 2 (depression) X 2 (desirability of event)
ANOVA Was performed on subjects' ratings of the controllability of the events, with desirability of event treated as a withinsubjects factor. For these ratings, we found only a main effect of depression, F(1, 41) = 6.80, p < .02. Nondepressed subjects generally rated the events as more controllable than did depressed subjects (Ms = 6.18 vs. 5.56). Thus, in contrast to the findings of studies on the control that subjects believe they exert over laboratory tasks (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979) , our nondepressed subjects, compared with depressed subjects, did not believe they exert less control over negative events.
To summarize, depressed subjects were clearly less optimistic about their futures than were nondepressed subjects. Nondepressed subjects judged positive events as more likely to happen than negative events and negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the typical student at their university; depressed subjects did not differ in the probability estimates they offered for positive and negative events occurring to themselves but did indicate that positive events were more likely than negative events for others and that positive events were less likely for themselves than for others. Relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely for themselves, negative events as more likely for themselves, and both positive and negative events as more likely for others. These findings are generally consistent with previous findings (e.g., Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985) in demonstrating that depressed individuals are less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts. However, unlike the Pietromonaco and Markus study that demonstrated depression-related differences in probability judgments for negative but not for positive events, our study demonstrated such differences for estimates of the likelihood of both positive and negative events.
The other finding of interest to emerge from Study 1 was that, in contrast to the findings of Alloy and Abramson (1979) , depressed persons rated the various events as less controllable than did nondepressed persons, regardless of their desirability. Possible explanations for this divergence are brought up in the general discussion. Note. Values in the table reflect probability judgments on a 50-point scale, with high numbers representing high probability.
Although Study 1 clearly shows that depressed persons are less optimistic than nondepressed persons in their probability estimates for future life events, the findings are relatively uninformative, in and of themselves, about the mechanisms underlying these differential perceptions. Indeed, although there has been a virtual explosion of research demonstrating various cognitive differences between depressed and nondepressed persons, studies that attempt empirically to specify variables that mediate these differences are extremely rare. Our second study was an investigation of the possibility that differential levels of selffocused attention mediate depressive pessimism.
On the basis of prior theoretical work on self-attentional processes by Dural and Wicldund (1972) and Carver and Scheier (1981) , we recently proposed a self-regulatory perseveration theory of depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, in press ) that may offer insights into these phenomena. The theory posits that depression results from an inability to exit a self-regulatory cycle following the loss of a central source of self-esteem. The high level of investment in the lost object makes normal defensive strategies for coping with the loss ineffective and thus inhibits the individual from exiting the self-regulatory cycle focused on recovering the object. This inability to exit the cycle and the resulting high level of self-focus produces a spiral of effects, including an intensification of negative affect, an increased tendency to make internal attributions for the loss, increases in the frequency of self-evaluations, and decreases in self-esteem, motivation, and performance.
Correlational research by Smith and Greenberg (1981) , Ingram and Smith (1984) , and Smith, Ingrain, and Roth (1985) has shown that depressed persons are generally highly selffocused. More recent evidence suggests one exception to this tendency: After a positive outcome, depressed persons seem to find self-focus aversive and actively avoid self-focus enhancing stimuli ; for a review, see Pyszczynski & Greenberg, in press ). These findings are quite consistent with the selfregulatory perseveration theory Of depression. To the extent that the individual has recently suffered the loss of an important source of self-worth, it follows that he or she would generally engage in high levels of self-focus as part of his or her perseverated self-regulatory attempts to regain the lost object. Thus, according to the theory, depressed individuals will, in most instances, be highly self-focused. However, to the extent that positive outcomes disrupt the individual's perseveration on the lost object and suggest cause for optimism, it follows that self-focus after such outcomes would be aversive and thus actively avoided.
Study 2
Our second study was an attempt to determine whether these differential self-focusing tendencies mediate the differences in probability estimates obtained in Study 1. Although, to our knowledge, previous research has not addressed the effects of self-focus on probability judgments, there is a theoretical rationale for such a prediction.
Self-focus, by definition, makes the self salient. Both Hull and Levy (1979) and Carver and Scheier (1981) have argued that self-focus increases the availability of one's self-schema. Consistent with this reasoning, research has shown that self-focus increases the effects of self-schemata on a wide range of socialcognitive tasks. More specifically, high levels of self-focus have been shown to be associated with enhanced incidental recall for words previously rated for extent of self-relevance (Hull & Levy, 1979 , Study 1), greater interference on a Stroop color-word task for self-relevant but not self-irrelevant words (Geller & Shaver, 1976) , an increased tendency to encode spontaneously incoming information with respect to its self-relevance (Turner, 1980) , more extensive self-descriptions (Turner, 1978a) , and faster reaction times when judging the self-descriptiveness of trait adjectives (Turner, 1978b) .
As Tversky and Kahneman (1973) have suggested, the more available or easily brought to mind is a given bit of information, the greater its impact on subsequent inferences. Research by Dural and Wicklund (1973) , Gibbons (1978) , Pryor, Gibbons, Wicldund, Fazio, & Hood (1977) , and others has consistently shown that self-focus increases the influence of self-relevant and internal sources of information on subsequent judgments and behavior (for a review of evidence on the relation between selffocus, self-schema activation, and effects on subsequent inferences and perceptions, see Carver & Scheier, 1981, pp. 
99-116).
On the basis of this reasoning, we hypothesized that high levels of self-focus increase the effect of an individual's self-schema on his or her estimates of the likelihood of future events and that low levels of self-focus decrease such effects.
Recent research by Kuiper, Derry, and MacDonald (1982; Kuiper, MacDonald, & Derry, 1983) suggests that the self-schemata of depressed individuals are more negative than the selfschemata of nondepressed persons. To the extent that depressed persons are chronically self-focused, it follows that negative thoughts, associations, and memories about the self will be highly available and thus especially likely to exert a negative impact on their expectancies for the future. If this high level of self-focus is responsible for their pessimism regarding future life events, then decreasing depressed persons' level of self-focus should at least temporarily reduce this pessimism. Thus we hypothesized that when depressed persons' level of self-focus is decreased, differences between their estimates of the likelihood of future life events and those made by nondepressed persons would be diminished. Given the positive self-image and optimistic bias typically found among the general population (e.g., Weinstein, 1980) , one might also predict that optimism would be greater among nondepressed persons when self-focus is high than when it is low.
Thus, the purpose of our second study was to investigate the role of self-focused attention in mediating depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the likelihood of positive and negative life events for self and others. To this end, we induced depressed and nondepressed subjects to focus either internally or externally and then asked them to make the same series of judgments as those made by subjects in Study I.
Method
Subjects. Eighty-six female undergraduates participated in the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The same criteria as those used in Study I were used for classifying subjects as depressed or nondepressed. The final sample consisted of 20 depressed subjects (BDI M = 17.7, MAACL M = 17.9) and 45 nondepressed subjects (BDI M = 1.6, MAACL M = 5.9).
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, with the addition of an attentional-focus manipulation in the booklet of questionnaires to which subjects responded. Subjects reported to the laboratory and were given packets containing (in order) the MAACL, the BDI, the self-focus induction, and the event questionnaire. With the exception of the self-focus manipulation, these materials were identical to those used in Study 1.
The self-focus manipulation consisted of a story-writing exercise developed by Fenigstein and Levine (1984) . Subjects were asked to write a short story, using as many words as possible from a list of 20 words, and were told that this was a measure of "verbal style?' In the self-focus condition, the list contained words such as L mirror, alone, and me; in the external-focus condition, the list contained words such as he, picture, together, and him. The external.focus subjects were asked to write about Abraham Lincoln; the protagonist for the self-focus subjects was not specified. Writing stories using self-relevant or other-relevant words forces subjects to direct their attention either toward or away from themselves. Fenigstein and Levine (1984) demonstrated the effectiveness of this manipulation in two studies by showing that writing stories using the self-referent word list produces higher levels of self-focus than does writing stories using the other-referent list. Previous research has also shown the manipulation to increase the internality of causal attributions for both real and hypothetical events (Fenigstein & Levine, 1984; Greenberg et ai., 1985) ; given previous demonstrations of the effect of self-focus on causal attributions (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1973) , these findings provide additional construct validation for the manipulation.
As in Study 1, subjects rated the probability of the positive and negative events occurring to themselves and to others and the controllability and desirability of each event. On completion of the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed, given experimental credit, and dismissed.
Results

Desirability.
A 2 (depression) X 2 (focus of attention) X 2 (desirability of event) ANOVA was performed on subjects' ratings of the desirability of the events, with desirability treated as a within-subjects factor. As in Study 1, positive events were strongly preferred over negative events, F(1, 61) = 1,399.87, p < .0001 (Ms = 7.69 and 1.44, respectively). Unlike in the first study, however, no Depression • Desirability interaction was obtained, F(I, 61) = .43, ns. Probability. A 2 (depression) • 2 (focus of attention) • 2 (desirability of event) • 2 (recipient of event) ANOVA, with desirability and recipient treated as within-subjects factors, was performed on subjects' probability ratings for the various events. The overall pattern of results was similar to that obtained in Study 1. A main effect of desirability of event F(I, 61) = 128.89, p < .001, a Depression • Desirability of Event interaction, F(I, 61) = 18.40, p < .001, and a Depression • Desirability of Event • Recipient of Event interaction, F( 1, 61) = 10.54, p < .01, were found. These results were qualified, however, by the predicted Depression • Focus of Attention • Desirability of Event • Recipient of Event interaction, F( 1, 61) = 6.54, p < .02. Relevant means may be found in Table 3 .
To explicate the nature of this complex interaction, individual three-way ANOVA$ were performed within the self-focus and external-focus conditions, using the error term from the overall analysis. As predicted, the Depression x Desirability • Recipient interaction that emerged in Study 1 was found in the self- Note. High values reflect high ratings on a 50-point probability scale.
focus condition, F(I, 61) = 16.73, p < .001, but not in the external-focus condition, F(I, 61) = .24, ns. Planned pairwise comparisons between depressed and nondepressed subjects revealed that serf-focused depressed subjects rated negative events as more likely to happen to both themselves, t(30) --7.04, p < .001, and others, t(30) = 2.32, p < .05; analogous depressed versus nondepressed subject differences did not emerge in the external-focus condition, t(31) = 1.48, ns, and t( 31 ) = 1.19, ns, respectively. The only depression-related difference to emerge in both self-focus and external-focus conditions was that depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to happen to themselves than did nondepressed subjects; this difference was somewhat weaker in the external-focus condition than in the self-focus condition, t(31) = 2.15, p < .05, and t(30) = 3.13, p < .01, respectively. It appears, then, that differences between depressed and nondepressed subjects were substantially attenuated in the external-focus condition. Looked at differently, whereas self-focused nondepressed subjects rated negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to others, t(21) = 8.22, p < .001, self-focused depressed subjects exhibited no such difference, t(9) = 1.52, p > .10. In the external-focus condition, however, both nondepressed and depressed subjects rated negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to others, t(22) = 6.17, p < .001, and t(9) = 3.82, p < .01, respectively. With respect to pairwise comparisons between attentional-focus conditions, compared with externally focused depressed subjects, self-focused depressed subjects rated negative events as more likely to happen to themselves, t(18) = 3.34, p < .01, and positive events as more likely to happen to others, t(18) = 2.14, p < .05. In addition, self-focused nondepressed subjects rated negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than did externally focused nondepressed subjects, t(43) ---2,13, p < .05. Thus it ap-pears that self-focus increased the pessimism of depressed subjccts and the optimism of nondcpressed subjects.
Controllability.
A Depression X Focus of Attention X Desirability of Event ANOVA, with desirability treated as a withinsubjects factor, was performed on subjects' ratings of the controllability of the events. As in Study 1, only a main effect of depression was obtained, F(I, 61) = 8.69, p < .005. Again, depressed subjects generally rated the events as less controllable than did nondepressed subjects, Ms = 5.58 and 6.16, respectively.
General Discussion
The results of Study 2 clearly support the hypothesis that selffocused attention at least partially mediates depressed individuals' pessimism about future life events. In the self-focus condition, depressed subjects rated negative events as far more likely to happen to themselves than did nondsprcmcd subjects. In contrast, in the external-focus condition, depressed subjects were no more pessimistic than nondepresscd subjects in these ratings. In addition, whereas depressed subjects in the self-focus condition did not exhibit a difference in their ratings of the likelihood of negative events occurring to self versus others, depressed subjects in the external-focus condition exhibited the same relative optimism found among nondepressed subjects, rating negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to others. Finally, externally focused depressed subjects rated negative events as less likely to occur to themselves and positive events as less likely to occur to others than did self-focused depressed subjects. The one exception to this overall pattern was that focus of attention had little effect on depressed subjects' ratings of the likelihood of positive events occurring to themselves. Although this difference was somewhat stronger in the self-focus condition, nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to occur to themselves than did depressed subjects, regardless ofattentional focus.
More generally, whereas the overall pattern of depressed persons' probability judgments in the self-focus condition of Study 2 was similar to that obtained in Study 1 (in which focus of attention was not manipulated), the pattern of depressed persons' judgments in the external-focus condition of Study 2 was not. Rather, the pattern of probability judgments for the externally focused depressed subjects was similar to that obtained from nondepressed subjects in both these and other studies (e.g., Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985) . Given previous findings that depressed individuals generally engage in high levels of selffocus (e.g., Ingrain & Smith, 1984; Smith & Greenberg, 1981; Smith et al., 1985) , the finding that inducing external focus decreases such individuals' pessimistic tendencies seems particularly noteworthy because it suggests a possible mediator of depressive pessimism. The findings are also consistent with the more general notion that self-focused attention plays an important role in the maintenance and exacerbation of depression, an idea that has been advocated recently by a number of theorists and researchers (e.g., Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 1985; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985, in press; Smith & Greenber~ 1981; Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, & Coyne, 1985) .
It is also worth noting that depressed subjects viewed positive events as less likely to occur to others when they were externally focused than when they were self-focused. This finding is consistent with Markus and Smith's (1981 ) contention that one's serf-schema influences the way others are perceived. In our study, the increased availability of negative self-relevant information produced by the depressed subjects' elevated levels of self-focus may have led to a contrast effect whereby other people were seen as especially likely to experience positive outcomes. When depressed subjects were externally focused, such contrasts with the self were presumably less salient, and thus others were rated as less likely to experience positive outcomes. These findings are consistent with the proposition that frequent activation of an increasingly, negative self-schema leads to a perscveration of the depressive state. As prior research has shown, increasing the availability of any cognitive structure increases its effects on subsequent cognitive activity (e.g., Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978) . Other findings suggest that the self-schemata of depressed persons are generally more negative than those of nondepressed persons (e.g., Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper et al., 1983) . Thus, to the extent that the self is generally highly salient for depressed persons, it follows that, in most instances, their thoughts and inferences would be more negative than those of nondepressed persons. This, of course, is consistent with the findings of Study 1 and the findings in the self-focus condition of Study 2. However, the findings from the external-focus condition of Study 2 suggest that focusing attention away from the self attenuates this negativity. Presumably, under such conditions depressed individuals' negative self-schemata are less available and thus exert less effect on their judgments.
The findings arc also consistent with the more general notion that cognitive structures exert an influence on inferential processes only when they are activated (cf. Markus, 1977; Wicklund & Frey, 1980) . They also suggest that integration of self-awareness perspectives on depression (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1985; Pyszczynski & Grcenberg, 1985, in press; Strack et al., 1985) with cognitive self-schema perspectives (e.g., Beck, 1967; Kuiper et al., 1982 Kuiper et al., , 1983 ) may be profitable. Although other studies have inferred the existence of a negative selfschema among depressed persons on the basis of differences in inferences, recall, and response times between depressed and nondcpressed subjects, our findings more directly demonstrate the operation of such a structure by showing that when attention is directed away from the self, the pessimistic judgments believed to be associated with a depressive self-schema are less likely to occur. As Hull and Levy (1979) and Carver and Scheier ( 198 l) have suggested, focusing attention on the self effectively activates an individual's self-schema; conversely, our findings suggest that focusing attention away from the self deactivates the self-schema and thus decreases the influence of a depressive state on one's inferences.
The induction of external focus used in this study reduced depressive pessimism in spite of the fact that making probability judgments was a task that, to some extent, required subjects to think about themselves. As both Duval and Wicklund (1972) and Carver and Scheier (198 l) acknowledged, self-focus is not an all-or-none phenomenon; manipulations of self-focus influence the proportion of time in which attention is focused on the self. It appears, then, that distracting depressed individuals from their self-preoccupation affects their later inferences, even when they must access self-relevant information to generate those inferences.
The effects of the attentional-focus manipulation on the probability judgments of nondepressed persons were generally consistent with those obtained for depressed persons. Although optimistic biases emerged in both self-focus and external-focus conditions, they were generally of greater magnitude under conditions of self-focus. As with depressed subjects, attentional focus affected judgments of the likelihood of negative but not positive events occurring to the self. However, the direction of this effect was opposite that observed with depressed subjects; nondepressed subjects judged negative events as less likely to occur to themselves when they were self-focused than when they were externally focused. This is consistent with the general notion that one's self-schema is most likely to affect inferences when one is self-focused. To the extent that nondepressed persons have a generally positive self-schema (cf. Kuiper et al., 1982 Kuiper et al., , 1983 Weinstein, 1980) , it follows that focusing attention internally would increase their optimism.
These findings are similar in some ways to Weinstein and Lachendro's (1982) finding that inducing subjects to think about the risk factors of others reduced the relative optimism in their comparative risk estimates for negative events. Our study shows that simply diverting subjects' attention from themselves produces similar effects, reducing the optimism of nondepressed subjects and the pessimism ofdepr~sed subjects. Perhaps both manipulations produced their effects through a similar mechanism. It would be difficult to argue that our manipulation led to greater attention being devoted to the risk factors of others; it is conceivable, however, that inducing subjects to think about the risk factors of others diverted attention from the self and thus decreased the availability of information supportive of an optimistic outlook. Although the two studies approach the problem from different perspectives, they both suggest that among nondepressed persons, focusing attention on the self is associated with an optimistic outlook on the future.
The other finding of note to emerge from these studies is that depressed subjects rated events as less controllable than did nondepressed subjects, regardless of the desirability of the events. Thus, unlike the recent findings of Alloy & Abramson (1979) that depressed individuals view positive events as less controllable (Experiments 2 and 3) and negative events as more controllable (Experiment 4) than do nondepressed individuals, our depressed subjects viewed both types of events as less controllable than did nondepressed subjects. We suggest that differences between studies in the time perspective for which judgments were made may account for this divergence in findings. Previous work on the illusion of control required subjects to judge how much control they were able to exert over a laboratory task on which they had recently obtained positive or negative feedback; in this study, subjects judged the controllability of real life outcomes that may or may not occur to them in the future. It may be that depressed persons generally believe that future outcomes are less controllable than do nondepressed persons, regardless of the outcomes' desirability. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that depressives would view future negative outcomes as more controllable than do nondepressives. Nonetheless, once an event has occurred, depressed persons may view a negative outcome as more controllable and a positive outcome as less controllable than do nondepressed persons because they have abandoned the defensive maneuvers routinely used by nondepressed persons. In other words, saying that a negative event is controllable threatens self-esteem if it has already happened but is reassuring if it is a potential future event. From this perspective, demonstrations of the absence of the illusion of control among depressives are viewed as demonstrations of the absence of self-serving bias. Given the relevance of depressed persons' control judgments to major theoretical perspectives on depression, an important direction for future work would be studies that directly compare such judgments for past and future events.
In summary, these findings indicate that although depressed persons are typically more pessimistic than nondepressed persons, this pessimism can be substantially reduced by focusing their attention away from themselves. Together with other recent findings that depressives' pessimistic attributions for performance outcomes can be attenuated by altering their focus of attention , these findings suggest that interventions aimed at changing their patterns ofattentional focus may be a promising approach for therapeutic work. Of course, given that our findings were based on a sample of subclinically depressed college students, future research with more severely depressed individuals will be necessary before definitive clinical suggestions can be made. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that attentional focus may play an important role in the maintenance of depressive pessimism and that intervention aimed at altering depressive self-focusing tendencies may be worthy of serious consideration as a therapeutic strategy in the treatment of depression.
